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COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
The great growth of corporate business during recent de-
cades, coupled with increasing ease of transit across state
lines has rendered the problem of controlling foreign corpora-
tions particularly acute. The power of a state to subject a
foreign corporation to personal jurisdiction when the corpora-
tion has not been granted a license to do business within the
state is an important aspect of this problem. It has been uni-
versally held by the courts that it is essential to the rendition
of a personal judgment that the corporation be doing business
within the state, regardless of the form of state statute au-
thorizing service of process.' The difficulty of analysis lies,
however, in what constitutes doing business.
The concept of doing business as it evolved has been predi-
cated upon various theories each having an effect on the
development of the rule.2 Originally the courts employed
what is known as the consent theory. By assuming that a
foreign corporation could transact business within a state
only if the latter consented, it was reasoned that certain condi-
tions could be imposed upon its activities.8 Thus, if a state stat-
ute provided for the appointment of a resident agent to receive
service of process, and the corporation appointed such an
agent, it was deemed to have impliedly consented to jurisdic-
tion.' The right to exclude, however, could not be exercised
in cases where the corporation was engaged in interstate
commerce and the theory became inadequate.5
To provide for situations where no consent could be implied
and to avoid burdening interstate commerce the courts began
I Philadelphia & Reading By. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 37 S. Ct. 280, 61
L. Ed. 710 (1917); International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579, 586, 34 S. Ct. 944, 946, 58 L. Ed. 1479 (1914); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS Sec. 89 (1934) A state can not exercise through its
courts jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, if the corporation has neither
consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of the state nor done
business within the state.
2 Comment, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 270 (1933).
a Layfayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. Ed. 451 (1856); St.
Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (1882).
' Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co., 243 U.S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1916).
5 International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 54 L. Ed. 678 (1909).
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employing the presence theory.6 This theory was based histori-
cally on the idea that an individual had to be present within
a state to be amenable to process in that jurisdiction., The
doctrine was then carried over to corporations by reasoning
that the latter might be present through acts of its agents.8
In the case of Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin,0 the Supreme
Court said, "A foreign corporation is amenable to process to
enforce a personal liability in the absence of consent only
if it is doing business within the state, in such manner and to
such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there.
And even if it is doing business within the state, the process
will be valid only if served upon some authorized agent."
In construing this proposition the Court has further stated,
that the determination of what constitutes doing business rests
with the discretion of the court and upon the facts of each
particular case.10 This theory has been somewhat clarified
by other decisions which have excluded certain activities from
the concept of doing business. In the case of Hutcheson v.
Chase and Gilbert," the rule was advanced that a single iso-
lated transaction would not amount to doing business ... that
there must be some continuous dealing in the state of the
forum, enough to demand a trial away from home. The rule
that mere solicitation did not amount to doing business was
definitely established under the presence theory and seemed
to have been the point of departure.12 In the case of Green v.
Chicago & B. Q. Ry.,13 the defendant Railway was held not to
be doing business within the state of the forum when its
agents merely solicited freight and passenger business to be
performed elsewhere. Where the soliciting agents performed
additional activities such as closing contracts, 14 receiving notes
6 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Sec. 78 (1st Ed. 1927).
' Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877).
8 See note 1, supra.
9 See note 1, supra.
10 Walton N. Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Commercial Industrial Co., 282 F. 21
(C. C. A. 9th 1922).
1145 F. 2d 139 (C.C.A. 2d 1930).
12 Peoples Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 87, 38 S. Ct. 233,
62 L. Ed. 587 (1918); Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140,
43 S. Ct. 293, 67 L. Ed. 573 (1922).
13 205 U. S. 531, 533, 534, 273 S. Ct. 595, 51 L. Ed. 916 (1906).
14 Michigan Aluminum Foundry Co. v. Aluminum Castings Co., 190 F. 879
(E. D. Mich. 1911).
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or checks,15 or handling claims and making collections, 16 the
foreign corporation was held to be doing business. If an office
or warehouse was maintained there was no dispute. 17 Generally
speaking the agent had to perform solicitation together with
acceptance or some performance of the contract within the
jurisdiction."' Apparently a cogent rule was not forthcoming
under the presence theory. The amount and quantity of busi-
ness activity was analyzed in each case and as a result no
practical test was established. It has been suggested that the
presence theory is a fiction, in that it is impossible to impute
the idea of locality to a corporation.'
The case of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington-0
placed the basis of the rule upon a new theory. Apparently the
test applied was whether the extent of business carried on
would make it reasonable to bring the corporation before
the courts of the particular state. This case involved a suit
by the state of Washington to require the defendant corpora-
tion to make contributions to the state unemployment compen-
sation fund.
Service of process was served on the defendant's agents
within the state. The defendant was a Delaware corporation
and maintained no contacts with the state of Washington other
than solicitation carried on by its agents. These agents made
,no contracts within the state for the sale or purchase of
merchandise and no stock of merchandise was maintained
or deliveries made. The authority of the agents was limited
to exhibiting their samples and soliciting orders at prices and
terms fixed by the defendant corporation. All orders were
transmitted to the defendant's home office for acceptance or
rejection and the merchandise was shipped from outside the
state to purchasers within the state. The salesmen had no
authority to contract or make collections and they were com-
pensated by commissions based on the amount of their sales.
They did, however, occasionally rent hotel rooms for the
purpose of exhibiting their samples.
16 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 586, 34 S. Ct. 944,
946, 58 L. Ed. 1479 (1914).
16 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57
L. Ed. 486 (1912).
17 Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
'8 Wills v. National Mineral Co., 176 Okla. 193, 55 P. 2d 449 (1936).
19 See note 11, supra.
20 326 U. S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, 161 A. L. R. 1057 (1945).
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The Supreme Court held that the Washington statute pro-
viding for service of process under such circumstances did
not contravene due process of law. It was further held that a
foreign corporation may be subjected to personal jurisdiction
if such contacts were established within the territorial forum
that the maintenance of the suit would not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. The court pointed
out that the defendant's activities within the state were con-
tinuous and gave rise to the liability sued upon. In answering
the defendant's plea that its activities within the state did
not manifest presence, the court said: "To say that a corpora-
tion is so far 'present' there as to satisfy due process require-
ments, for purposes of taxation or maintenance of suits against
it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided.
For the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to
symbolize those activities . . . which courts will deem to be
sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. Those demands
may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state
of the forum as make it reasonable"... to require the corpora-
tion to defend the particular suit which is brought there."
The opinion in the International Shoe Case, supra, obviously
rejected the presence theory and presumably embodied an at-
tempt to establish the test of reasonableness as a guide for
lower courts to follow. In view of the uncertainty of prior
decisions it would seem that the decision in that case was an
attempt to clarify such uncertainty.
A class of cases recently decided indicate that the Shoe Case,
supra, has effected a change in the concept of doing business
and that mere solicitation or a very little more than solicita-
tion would be sufficient to render a foreign corporation ame-
nable to personal jurisdiction. In the case of Winkler Kock
Engineering Co. v. Universal Products Co., 21 the defendant
corporation was held to be doing business in New York when
its agents rendered certain services to customers in addition to
soliciting business. The court stated that the doctrine of
reasonableness as set forth in the Shoe Case, supra, had ampli-
fied the concept that mere solicitation did n6t amount to doing
business. It was pointed out in the opinion that if the mere
solicitation rule still obtains it readily yields to slight addi-
2170 F. Supp. 77 (S. D. N. Y. 1946).
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tions.22 It would seem that the rule that a very little more than
solicitation amounts to doing business would have little ad-
vantage over the old rule. The necessity of comparing the
quantity of business activity with prior precedent would still
exist. The case of Lasky v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,'2 would seem to
present a more reasonable and practical application of the
Shoe Case doctrine. In that case the defendant corporation was
held to be doing business when the only activity carried on
within the state of the forum was' the solicitation of freight
and passenger business. Following the opinion in the Shoe
Case, Supra, the court stated that the case of Green v. Chicago
B. Q. Ry., supra, had in effect been overruled. From this case
it is possible to advance the thesis that mere solicitation would
amount to doing business if the solicitation was continuous
and gave rise to the liability sued upon. If the Shoe Case, supra,
would be accepted broadly as standing for this proposition it
would seem that some measure of uncertainty would be re-
solved.
It was pointed out in the opinion of the case of State v.
The Ford Motor Co.e" that the doctrine of reasonableness allows
a distinction between causes of action that arise within the
state and those that arise outside the state.25 The fact that the
cause of action arises out of local activity then becomes an ad-
ditional factor in determining amenability to process. It would
seem that such an interpretation would correct an inherent
weakness manifested by the presence theory. Under the pres-
ence theory a corporation once found within a particular
jurisdiction became amenable to process there regardless of
where the cause of action arose.
Another class of cases decided since the Shoe Case, supra,
indicate that cases are still being decided upon precedents
established under the presence theory. In the case of Mc-
Whorter v. Anchor Serum Co. 26 the defendant corporation was
held not to be doing business when the only activity carried on
22 Such an interpretation undoubtedly stems from the fact that in the Shoe
Case the Defendent's agent occasionally rented hotel rooms for the purpose of
exhibiting their samples, in addition to soliciting business.
23 157 F. 2d 674 (C. C. A. 6th 1946).
24 208 S. C. 379, 38 S. E. 2d 242 (1946).
25 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Sec. 92 (1934). A state can exercise
through its courts jurisdiction over a foreign corporation doing business within
the state at the time of service of process as to causes of action arising out of
business done within the state.
26 72 F. Supp. 437 (W. D. Ark. 1947).
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within the state of the forum was the solicitation of business.
Following the case of International Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tuck y, 27 the court stated that the maintenance of a mere soli-
citing agent did not amount to doing business. The cause of
action in this case arose out of local activity. In the case of
Murray v. Great N. Ry.25 the defendant corporation was held
not to be doing business when the only activities carried on
within the state attempting to impose jurisdiction was the soli-
citation of freight and passenger business. This decision was
apparently based on the case of Green v. Chicago & B. Q. Ry.,
supra, which like the International Harvester Case, supra, was
a leading case under the presence theory. The liability in suit
did not arise out of local activity but this fact was not pointed
out in the opinion as an important consideration. The court at-
tempted to distinguish the Shoe Case, supra, on the ground
that the solicitation of transportation did not amount to a
principle part of the defendant's business. It would seem that
the solicitation of transportation is as much a part of the trans-
portation business as the solicitation of shoe customers is a
principle part of the shoe business. In the case of Bomze v.
Nardis Sportswear Inc., 29 the defendant corporation was held
to be doing business within the state of the forum when it
hired a New York firm to solicit business. The soliciting firm
leased permanent premises for display purposes and the de-
fendant's name appeared on the office door as wel las in various
public directories. The court stated that the Shoe Case, supra,
was not controlling because a question of taxation was in-
volved in that case.30 On appeal the decision was reversed.
The court held that the business carried on by the defendant
corporation was sufficient to bring the case within the New
York cases decided under the presence theory. It was pointed
out in the opinion that the state law need not extend to suitors'
access to its courts as ample as it has power to do under the
constitution. That is the constitution as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court determines the lower limits of
due process but the state law may prescribe a higher standard
in determining amenability to process. In this case the action
27 See note 15, supra.
2867 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
29 68 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. N.Y. 1946) Reversed 165 F. 2d 33 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
80 This distinction would seem specious in view of the opinion in the Shoe
Coe which specifically stated that the same rule should apply in suits brought
by individuals.
COMMENTS
had been removed from a state court so the defendant had not
lost his right to challenge the validity of process in that court.
The court stated that it was therefore constrained to follow
the New York law, although dictum in the case indicated that
the doctrine as set forth in the Shoe Case, supra, would be
preferrable, and that if liability in suit arises out of the local
activity it should not be necessary to go further except to show
that the business was continuous.
The problems discussed here has been stated generally as in-
volving a balancing of opposing interests. That is, balancing
the convenience of the individual wishing to bring suit against
the inconvenience of the corporation which is required to de-
fend.31 Closely associated with the latter consideration is that
fact that subjecting a corporation to jurisdiction in a parti-
cular state might amount to a burden on interstate com-
merce. In relation to this problem the rule has been advanced
that because a corporation might be engaged in interstate com-
merce does not of itself render it immune from jurisdiction.82
It has been further pointed out that if the liability in suit
arises out of local activity there is much less danger of burden-
ing interstate commerce.83 Proceeding upon these considera-
tions it would seem that when a foreign corporation comes into
a state and pursues a regular course of business, whether it be
solicitation or otherwise, it would be reasonable to require
it to defend suits arising out of such activity. An important
consideration should be the protection of the individuals deal-
ing with such a corporation. As suggested by the Shoe Case,
supra, if the corporation accepts the benefits offered by a state,
it should also bear corresponding responsibilities. As the case
indicated, no apparent uniformity of decision has been forth-
coming since the Shoe Case, supra. Cases are being decided
upon different theories and employ different rules. There is
obvious need for a cogent rule defining the limits in either di-
rection.
ROBERT A. CASE
Third Year Law Student.
31 See note 11, supra.
82 See note 15, aupra.
88 Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. MeDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 21, 27 S. Ct.
236, 51 L. Ed. 345, 350 (1907).
